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Comment 
A PROCESS-BASED APPROACH TO 
PRESIDENTIAL EXIT 
MARK SEIDENFELD† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, Professors J.B. Ruhl and Jim Salzman published a 
pathbreaking article: Regulatory Exit.1 That article suggests that 
regulators ought to pay more attention to how regulatory programs 
and relationships end, rather than just focusing on creating programs 
without any thought to their termination. Furthermore, Ruhl and 
Salzman identify two dimensions that characterize regulatory exit that 
can help creators of regulatory programs think about how to structure 
“exit.” The first is whether the criteria for exit are (or should be) 
specified ex ante—when the design of the program or regulatory 
interaction is established—rather than ex post—after the program is 
operating and the interaction is ongoing.2 The second dimension is 
whether the specification of what triggers exit should be transparent 
and rule-like—depending only on the existence of clearly delineated 
facts—rather than opaque or fuzzy—like flexible standards whose 
operation depend on imperfectly specified balancing of a variety of 
factors.3 
In their contribution to this symposium on Exit and the 
Administrative State, Ruhl and Salzman focus on Presidential Exit—
exit from regulatory programs created and administered by the 
president without need for action by any congressionally created 
administrative agency.4 Such exit is especially interesting because the 
source of the president’s authority to create regulatory programs 
varies: sometimes that authority is granted to the president by statute; 
 
Copyright © 2018 Mark Seidenfeld. 
       †   Patricia A. Dore Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. 
 1.  J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (2015).  
 2.  Id. at 1312–14. 
 3.  Id. at 1312, 1314–16. 
 4.  J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Presidential Exit, 67 DUKE L.J. 1729, 1736–40 (2018). 
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other times the president’s authority flows directly from his 
constitutional powers, such as his role as commander-in-chief or his 
responsibility to see that the laws are faithfully executed.5 One might 
reasonably surmise that the propriety of Congress imposing exit 
criteria on the president must depend on the source of the president’s 
authority in that instance. Additionally, unlike the heads of 
administrative agencies, the president is the embodiment of the 
executive branch, and constitutionally he is coequal with the other two 
branches, Congress and the courts. This too might affect the propriety 
of congressionally imposed criteria for presidential exit. This Essay 
comments on both of these Ruhl and Salzman articles by distinguishing 
process-based constraints on exit from substantive exit criteria. This 
Essay posits that, because of difficulties in specifying substantive exit 
criteria that serve the goals of a regulatory program, often process-
based criteria can more effectively serve such goals. 
Part I addresses the general notion of regulatory exit that was the 
subject of Regulatory Exit. I note that Ruhl and Salzman focus on 
substantive criteria for when exit should occur. But, it is virtually 
impossible to know ex ante all of the substantive criteria that should 
trigger some type of exit—whether that be an end to the program, the 
end of the relationship of a particular participant in the program to the 
remainder of the regulated community, or more nuanced changes to 
either the program or its relationship to a particular participant. For 
this reason, I contend that although substantive criteria for exit may be 
beneficial, process-based requirements for exit are probably more 
fundamental to a vast majority of programs. Moreover, in contrast to 
Ruhl and Salzman’s insight that substantive criteria for regulatory exit 
generally are underspecified and not sufficiently considered, the 
regulatory state nearly always provides the procedures that an agency 
must follow before engaging in exit of any kind,6 and usually a process 
for judicial appeal or review.7 Furthermore, such processes are usually 
structured to ensure that exit is justified by either objective analyses or 
 
 5.  For the purposes of this Essay, it is not important to distinguish those situations in which 
Congress shares authority over a matter with the president from those in which the president has 
exclusive authority. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) 
(offering opinions of several justices on the relationship of the president’s constitutional powers 
to those of Congress); see also Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (holding that the 
president has exclusive power to decide whether to recognize Jerusalem as part of Israel).  
 6.  See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–557, 559 (2012). 
 7.  Id. § 706; Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–41 (1967) (stating that there is a 
presumption of availability of judicial review). 
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changes in the values of the polity. That is, the administrative state has 
spent considerable time and effort developing policymaking processes 
that essentially require agencies to lay out the implications of their exit 
decisions; these processes increase the transparency of the values 
furthered by the agency’s regulatory action, and thereby foster political 
accountability.8 
Part II turns to the particular question of presidential exit, for 
which procedures are less studied and developed. I address how the 
sources of presidential regulatory authority and the president’s role as 
the head of a constitutionally coequal branch of government explain 
the dearth of process-based prerequisites to presidential exit. Finally, I 
appeal to deliberative democracy’s justification for the administrative 
state to suggest that the public interest might be well served by 
subjecting presidential regulatory decisions to judicial review, 
requiring the president to explain why he believes these actions 
promote the public interest. Throughout this Essay, I use President 
Trump’s efforts to exit President Obama’s Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy to illustrate how process-based 
criteria that govern regulatory change can meaningfully constrain 
agency and presidential decisions to exit from preexisting regulatory 
policies. 
I. PROCESSES FOR REGULATORY EXIT 
It is helpful to carefully define Ruhl and Salzman’s concept of 
regulatory exit in order to identify the processes that law mandates an 
agency follow before engaging in such exit. They define exit broadly as 
“the intentional, significant reduction in governmental intervention 
initiated at a particular time under specified processes and 
conditions.”9 Ruhl and Salzman then go on to state that, from the 
perspective of the administrative agency, exit may be the elimination 
of a program in its entirety, or it may be relaxation of “a regulatory 
threshold defining the class of regulated entities . . . or [reduction of] 
the intensity of permitting standards and procedures . . . as is done 
through the general permit mechanism.”10 Exit may also reflect a 
determination that an entity subject to regulation has met some 
threshold that removes it from regulatory oversight. 
 
 8.  See Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 162, 194–97 (2012). 
 9.  Ruhl & Salzman, Regulatory Exit, supra note 1, at 1302. 
 10.  Id.  
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Of course, regulatory exit requires a preexisting regulatory 
relationship with private entities. Hence, exit can be seen as part of the 
general concept of administration action. “Entrance” creates the 
relationship and “exit” reduces or eliminates it. Ruhl and Salzman’s 
contribution to this symposium, Presidential Exit, clarifies that exit 
from one policy is really the imposition of a substitute policy. For 
example, President Obama maintained DACA as a policy that created 
enforcement priorities that essentially guaranteed that noncitizen 
residents of the United States who had entered the country prior to 
their sixteenth birthday and remained without proper immigration 
documentation would not be deported, and would instead be able to 
obtain work permits allowing them to work legally in the United States. 
When President Trump’s acting secretary of homeland security 
reversed the Obama administration’s DACA policy,11 so-called 
dreamers exited the DACA program and entered into a different and 
more invasive relationship with Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement.12 Thus, there often is no clear distinction between exit of 
one regulatory relationship and entrance into another. So understood, 
in terms of governmental action, Ruhl and Salzman’s concept of exit 
essentially covers any regulatory action that alters some entity’s (often 
many entities’) legal rights or obligations. And as any student of 
administrative law knows, much of that subject is devoted to the 
procedures that entities must follow when taking regulatory action and 
judicial review of such action. 
For example, a regulator often initiates exit via an adjudicatory 
 
 11.  David Nakamura, Trump Administration Announces End of Immigration Protection for 
‘Dreamers,’ WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2017/09/05/trump-administration-announces-end-of-immigration-protection-
program-for-dreamers/?utm_term=.3a6d331e9fbd [http://perma.cc/D8VT-HTC3]; see also U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., MEMORANDUM ON RESCISSION OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR 
CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca [http://perma.cc/3E3D-
6ZQP] [hereinafter DACA Rescission Memo]. 
 12.  After the termination of DACA, lawsuits were filed challenging the Trump 
administration’s action to terminate the program. Multiple district court judges granted 
preliminary injunctions requiring the government to maintain the DACA program. See Regents 
of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting 
a preliminary injunction requiring the federal government to maintain DACA and allow 
individuals to submit applications to renew their enrollment in DACA); see also Vidal v. Nielsen, 
279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (granting a preliminary injunction requiring the government 
to accept DACA applications from people who previously had DACA); Elizabeth Redden, 
DACA Lives, but for How Long?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.inside
highered.com/news/2018/03/05/daca-continues-now-colleges-and-students-face-uncertainties 
[http://perma.cc/ZW7H-9MHM]. 
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proceeding evaluating whether a private entity has satisfied ex ante 
established regulatory criteria, or whether changed circumstances 
render an entity no longer subject to regulation. The regulator looks at 
past conduct to determine the rights and obligations of the entity under 
the program that the regulator administers.13 Under the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), if the statute authorizing 
regulatory action calls for a hearing and a decision based on the record 
thereby created, the regulatory hearing must follow the formal trial-
type procedures laid out in the APA.14 If the authorizing statute does 
not call for a hearing on the record, the APA requires minimal 
procedures,15 although the authorizing statute itself might specify 
procedures above those the APA requires for such informal 
adjudication. 
If the agency initiates exit by prospectively eliminating or 
modifying a program—and in the process changes the legal rights and 
obligations of regulated entities—then the agency usually acts through 
rulemaking.16 As for adjudication, the APA requires trial-type 
procedures when the statute authorizing the rulemaking requires the 
agency to hold a hearing and base the resulting rule on the hearing 
record,17 although today statutes calling for such formal rulemaking are 
unusual. More frequently, the agency must provide a notice of 
proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for interested persons to 
comment on the proposal before adopting a final rule. 
Crucially, almost all agency action, whether based on evaluation 
of ex ante criteria or changing those criteria ex post, is subject to 
judicial review to ensure that the agency followed proper procedures, 
acted within its statutory authority, and did not act arbitrarily and 
capriciously.18 Significantly, courts have molded the arbitrary and 
 
 13.  Under the APA, any retrospective agency action that applies, rather than creates, 
standards is adjudication. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C §§ 551 (4), (6)–(7) (defining 
adjudication as “the process for the formulation of an order,” which in turn is any action other 
than a rule, which is any agency “statement of . . . future effect designed to implement, interpret 
or prescribe law or policy”).  
 14.  Id. § 554(a). 
 15.  Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655–56 (1990); see also Finer 
Foods, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 274 F.3d 1137, 1140–41 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that a statute 
calling for a hearing triggered informal adjudication under the APA, but nonetheless entitling the 
petitioner to some hearing before a neutral decisionmaker under the statute). 
 16.  See 5 U.S.C §§ 551 (4)–(5). 
 17.  Id. § 553(c). 
 18.  There is a presumption that agency action is reviewable, although the action must be 
ripe for review, and usually final, before a court will review it. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Abbott Labs. 
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capricious standard into a process-oriented review, requiring the 
agency to clearly set out the factual predicates for its action, and to 
explain the implications of its action—the trade-offs between that 
action and alternatives, including the alternative of doing nothing.19 In 
addition, courts have structured review of agencies’ interpretation of 
their statutory authority to require an inquiry similar to Chevron step-
two analysis.20 
One might wonder what procedures and judicial review have to do 
with Ruhl and Salzman’s call for consideration of exit criteria. Judicial 
review does not undercut the importance of their call for agencies to 
consider substantive criteria for ending or modifying programs; 
however, judicial review does provide an important backstop to agency 
exit decisions. Even when factors are relatively transparent and 
specified ex ante, there may be uncertainty about precisely what they 
entail, or about how an agency should best apply them. Hence, even 
for this determinate category of exit, there is bound to be some 
discretion in how an agency ultimately evaluates whether exit is 
appropriate and what that exit should entail. Given the necessary 
uncertainty surrounding the relationship between exit decisions and 
regulatory goals, the public interest requires use of agency expertise 
and decisionmaking structures that emphasize deliberation rather than 
political decisionmaking.21 The need for explicit deliberation becomes 
 
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967). 
 19.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46–52 (1983). The 
current approach to judicial review is predicated on the idea that the courts must ensure that the 
agency took a hard look at all matters relevant to the action under review. See Greater Boston 
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851–53 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (creating the hard look test); see 
also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (demanding under arbitrary 
and capricious review that an agency consider all “relevant factors”); see also Seidenfeld, supra 
note 8, at 155–57 (describing how arbitrary and capricious review requires the agency to identify 
the trade-offs inherent in its action).  
 20.  See, e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011) (suggesting in dicta that State 
Farm’s arbitrary and capricious standard and Chevron step-two analysis are “the same”); 
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–07 (2015) (holding that the EPA’s interpretation of the 
Clean Air Act’s provisions governing regulation of existing power plants to allow the EPA to 
ignore the costs of regulation was unreasonable under step two of Chevron); see also Kent Barnett 
& Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5–10, 33–45 (2017); 
Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2390–91 
(2018); Mark Seidenfeld, Revisiting Congressional Delegation of Interpretive Primacy as the 
Foundation for Chevron Deference, 25 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at *22–
24) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 21.  Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law, 
97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 852, 885–896 (2012); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Foreword to the Annual 
Review of Administrative Law: The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative 
State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1444–1457 (2013) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, The Role of 
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even greater when the factors that bear on the exit decision are not 
known ex ante, and when the manner of weighing those factors cannot 
be established in a predetermined—and therefore transparent—
fashion. In addition, value judgments about what kind of exit, if any, is 
best for society often attach to exit decisions. Although such value 
judgments usually fall within the ambit of politics rather than law, 
judicial review can help ensure that an agency does not hide these value 
judgments behind faulty factual determinations and predictions; 
judicial review, therefore, facilitates political accountability for exit 
decisions.22 
II.  PROCESSES AS A CONSTRAINT ON PRESIDENTIAL EXIT 
Before addressing process as a constraint on presidential exit, it is 
important to clarify just what I, along with Professors Ruhl and 
Salzman, mean by presidential exit. The past few presidents have 
issued numerous regulatory executive orders. These often reverse 
actions of the prior administration, and hence constitute exit under 
Ruhl and Salzman’s definition.23 Many of these orders, however, are 
instructions to executive officials to implement regulatory programs as 
the president dictates. The president, as the coordinator of the 
executive branch, can certainly issue such instructions, but the most 
widely held view—and the view to which presidential conduct has 
conformed—is that the president does not have inherent power as head 
of the executive branch to dictate actions to officials that Congress has 
authorized to act.24 Under this understanding of the president’s 
 
Politics]. 
 22.  See Seidenfeld, Irrelevance of Politics, supra note 8, at 144, 163–64. 
 23.  See Ruhl & Salzman, Presidential Exit, supra note 4, at 1738–39. 
 24.  Scholars who argue that the Constitution created a unitary executive headed by the 
president, contend that the president has authority to make all decisions left to the executive 
branch. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE. L.J. 541, 596 (1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The 
Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 991–94 (1993). However, 
the traditional view sees the constitutional role of the president as overseer—not decider—of 
administrative policy that has been delegated by statute to an agency official. See Kevin M. Stack, 
The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267 (2006); 
Peter Strauss, Foreword: Overseer or “the Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704–05 (2007). But see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2249–53 (2001) (arguing against the unitary executive position as a matter 
of constitutional law, but arguing that statutes allow the president to direct agency decisions 
whenever the decisionmaker is removable at will by the president); Kathryn Watts, Controlling 
Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 728 (2016) (stating that the Supreme Court has not 
answered the question: “when can the president step into the shoes of the agency and make a 
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constitutional power, a congressionally authorized official need not 
heed the president’s instructions if she is willing to pay the price of 
ignoring them.25 If, as usually occurs, the official does comply with the 
president’s instructions, then it is the official’s action—not the 
president’s instruction—that has the force of law; the processes 
dictated for regulatory action then apply to the official’s action. 
For example, in September 2017 the media reported that 
President Trump reversed the Obama administration’s DACA 
program.26 In actuality, DACA was created by an exercise of 
enforcement discretion granted by statute to the secretary of homeland 
security, and not by President Obama. Similarly, the DACA 
termination was implemented by a memorandum issued by the acting 
secretary of homeland security, and not by an action of President 
Trump.27 The memorandum constitutes a general statement of policy, 
which as an agency—as opposed to a presidential—action is subject to 
judicial review. Given that such constraints already exist for 
presidential decisions that have to be implemented by agency action, I 
will limit my discussion, as Ruhl and Salzman do, to presidential orders 
 
decision that Congress delegated to a specified agency official?”). Even when President Richard 
Nixon wanted to fire Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox during the Watergate investigation, he 
did not do so directly. Nixon instead asked the person acting as attorney general to do so. This 
resulted in Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William 
Ruckelshaus resigning rather than following the president’s order, and Cox remained in his 
position until he was fired by Solicitor General Robert Bork, who became acting attorney general 
upon the resignations of Richardson and Ruckelshaus.  
 25.  If the matter is of sufficient importance to the president, and if he has the power to do 
so, presumably the president will fire the official for ignoring his instructions. Another potential 
cost of ignoring presidential will is reduction of White House support for programs headed by the 
official, which is likely to result in loss of funding for such programs. Kirti Datla & Richard L. 
Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
769, 822–824 (2013); Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 594 (1984) (“The commissions need goods the 
president can provide: budgetary and legislative support, assistance in dealing with other agencies, 
legal services, office space, and advice on national policy.”). Of course, the president may also 
pay a price for exacting a price from the official, for example, the loss of an effective member of 
the president’s administration or a decrease in funding for programs the president supports. See 
Strauss, supra, at 589–91; see also Kagan, supra note 24, at 2274 (“[T]he president often cannot 
make effective use of his removal power given the political costs of doing so.”).  
 26.  Tal Kopan, Trump Ends DACA but Gives Congress Window To Save It, CNN (Sept. 5, 
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/05/politics/daca-trump-congress/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/9W8S-8D4D]; Veronica Stracqualursi & Adam Kelsey, Trump Administration 
Announces Plan To End DACA, ABC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
trump-expected-announce-daca-decision-today/story?id=49611829 [https://perma.cc/97AP-
2XAB]; Anthony Zurcher, Trump’s DACA Dilemma- and Dodge, BBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41153609 [https://perma.cc/AT4G-FZV5]. 
 27.  DACA Rescission Memo, supra note 11.  
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that have direct force of law. 
Having clarified what constitutes presidential exit, let me proceed 
to address why the benefits of procedure and judicial review attach to 
presidential action. From a deliberative democratic perspective, 
procedures help ensure that the decisionmaker, whether agency or 
president, receives and considers relevant stakeholder input.28 Judicial 
review, properly structured, ensures that the decisionmaker takes 
care;29 it also restrains the decisionmaker from creatively spinning facts 
to essentially mislead the public about the implications of its action.30 
To be sure, the president has different strengths and incentives 
than do agencies. The costs of procedure and judicial review may be 
greater for presidential action than for agency action. Presidents may 
have to act so quickly that there is not time for procedures prior to their 
decisionmaking. The president may also have a greater need to keep 
deliberations confidential to protect national security. The potential 
for delay caused by procedures and judicial review, therefore, may 
render them inappropriate for a greater percentage of presidential 
action than agency action. The benefits of procedure and judicial 
review may also be less for presidential action than for agency action. 
Unlike agency heads, the president is a political being who is directly 
accountable to the people. Accordingly, the White House is 
structurally more attuned to popular reaction to presidential action 
than are agencies with respect to agency action.31 
At the same time, the president’s political outlook is likely to 
 
 28.  See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1559–62, 1572–76 (1992); see also Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: 
Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 448–49 (2010); 
Staszewski, supra note 21, at 885–893. 
 29.  See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2002) 
 30.  See Seidenfeld, Irrelevance of Politics, supra note 8, at 144, 177–79. I am not alone in 
looking for process-based constraints on presidential control of regulation. See, e.g., Nina A. 
Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 
1130–31 (2010); Watts, supra note 24, at 740–45. The proposals by Watts and Mendelson address 
presidential influence on agency action already subject to procedural constraints and judicial 
review, and hence cannot control direct regulatory actions by the president. In addition, I have 
explained why disclosure of White House interaction with agencies and crediting judicial review 
is unlikely to constrain, and may even exacerbate, problematic presidential influence. See 
Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics, supra note 21, at 1454–57. President Trump’s tweets, by which 
he directly communicates with the public, have strengthened my conviction that disclosure of the 
president’s position on regulatory matters will not constrain politically motivated decisions that 
undermine the public interest.  
 31.  See Kagan, supra note 24, at 2335; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and 
Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L REV. 469, 507–08 (1985). 
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encourage him to view data and predicted effects of his actions in a 
light most favorable to his action and to spin the action accordingly. 
Established procedures can provide a reliable record to counter 
questionable presidential factual assertions, and judicial review can 
provide an objective analysis of that record. The phenomenon of White 
House spin, which today rises to the level of the Trump White House 
alleging “fake news,”32 suggests that procedures and judicial review for 
presidential action may provide huge returns in increased quality of 
presidential decisionmaking. Thus, while courts might need to massage 
the availability and perhaps the precise structure of hard look review 
to make it work for presidential exit, some version of such review does 
promise potentially enormous benefits. 
Returning to the termination of DACA example, a district court 
reversed the “Trump” change in DACA, which the acting secretary 
had premised on the unlawfulness of the creation of the program in the 
first place.33 The judge ruled that the secretary of homeland security 
had authority to create the program, and therefore that the justification 
given by the assistant secretary was inadequate. The ultimate result, if 
the district court ruling stands, is that the Trump administration will 
either acquiesce in continuing DACA, or it must justify ending the 
program as a policy matter. In essence, if President Trump ends 
DACA, he will have to take responsibility for that action as a matter 
of policy; that would be at odds with his public position that he favors 
DACA but thinks that Congress must authorize it for it to be lawful.34 
Although judicial review was available because the secretary of 
homeland security, rather than the president, had the authority to take 
this action, the termination of DACA illustrates how process-based 
constraints on exit can help the electorate hold the president politically 
 
 32.  Steve Coll, Donald Trump’s “Fake News” Tactics, NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/11/donald-trumps-fake-news-tactics [http://
perma.cc/K2CF-LEXE]; see also Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 7, 2018, 
12:35 P.M.) (“The Fake News Awards, those going to the most corrupt & biased Mainstream 
Media, will be presented to the losers on Wednesday, January 17th . . . .”), https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/950103659337134080?lang=en [https://perma.cc/24NC-TN7Z]. 
 33.  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. 
Cal. 2018); see also Aubree Eliza Weaver, Trump Calls Courts ‘Broken’ After Judge Blocks 
DACA Wind-down, POLITICO (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/10/judge-
daca-ruling-trump-response-333153[https://perma.cc/X7BL-MHKY]. 
 34.  Katie Reilly, Here’s What President Trump Has Said About DACA in the Past, TIME 
(Sept. 5, 2017), http://time.com/4927100/donald-trump-daca-past-statements/ [https://perma.cc/
7VSW-EA3W]; see also Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves To End DACA 
and Calls on Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/05/us/politics/trump-daca-dreamers-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/G75R-rUXH]. 
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accountable for his actions. 
Although procedures and judicial review would undoubtedly 
encourage more deliberative—and therefore, I believe, wiser—
presidential exit, the extent to which Congress and the courts can 
impose such process-based constraints may be severely limited. In 
particular, the ability to impose such constraints depends on whether 
the president is exercising statutorily granted authority when he 
demands exit from a regulatory program, or instead authority 
stemming from his inherent Article II constitutional powers. In the 
context of the administrative state, Vermont Yankee holds that it is 
inappropriate for courts to impose procedures on agency action 
beyond those required by statutory or constitutional law. This is usually 
sound policy because courts do not have the expertise to structure 
procedure for the vast array of contexts within which agencies act. 
They may well overestimate the benefits of procedures and fail to 
appreciate the burdens procedures impose. Moreover, procedures may 
be inextricable from outcomes; procedural burdens would increase the 
cost of action and thereby reduce or even preclude certain presidential 
action.35 Courts have, of course, added to the minimal requirements of 
APA rulemaking by requiring that notice of a proposed rule allow for 
meaningful comment,36 and by creating the hard look doctrine of 
judicial review.37 But they have done so to implement the purposes 
underlying specific provisions in the APA and agency organic statutes 
that provide for notice-and-comment and arbitrary and capricious 
judicial review. Thus, courts are not creating burdens out of whole 
cloth. The question is whether courts can find similar pegs on which to 
hang required procedures and review for presidential exit. 
Unfortunately, I can find no such pegs in the Constitution itself. 
While it specifies a precise procedure for enacting statutes and imposes 
due process as a constraint on judicial procedure, the Constitution is 
completely silent on procedure for actions by the president. Therefore, 
when the president acts pursuant to direct authority in the 
 
 35.  See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme 
Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 404–08 (noting that Congress may impose procedures to bias 
agency action toward certain outcomes). 
 36.  See Peter Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 497, 520 (2013) (“[For the past four decades] judges have understood the statutory 
requirement to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register also to require 
agencies simultaneously to release important materials on which the proposal relies”). 
 37.  See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking 
in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 128 & n.239 (1994). 
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Constitution—such as when he manages the operations of the 
executive branch in the absence of statutory direction,38 or when he acts 
in his role as the commander in chief of the military—there does not 
seem to be a solid legal ground for imposing procedures or judicial 
review on such action. 
The propriety of process-based constraints improves, I believe, 
when the president acts pursuant to a statutory delegation from 
Congress because statutes can prescribe procedures and judicial review 
on presidential action. Some might find this belief unremarkable 
because if Congress can withhold the power from the president 
entirely, it seems logical that Congress should be able to condition the 
exercise of that power however it sees fit. This does not necessarily 
follow.39 If one views creation of law, which is at the core of the 
legislative power, as entirely distinct from the execution of the law, 
then one might argue that Congress oversteps its bounds if it constrains 
the head of the executive branch in implementing of the law. Virtually 
no one doubts the validity of statutorily created procedures and judicial 
review of agency action. There is a difference, however, between 
appointed agency officials—whose institutional existence depends on 
the agency organic statute—and the elected president, in whom “the 
executive Power [is] vested.”40 
The distinction between creation and execution of the law, 
however, is not well defined, and drawing the line between the two 
types of action is impossible so long as one recognizes that execution 
of the law necessarily involves policymaking discretion. Jurists and 
scholars alike have relied on the difficulty of distinguishing execution 
from creation of law to justify the current moribund state of the 
nondelegation doctrine.41 When a statute specifies the process by which 
 
 38.  If Congress either lacks power over a matter or simply has not exercised its power, then 
the president’s action on the matter is pursuant to his powers under Article II of the Constitution. 
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636–37 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (noting that the president may have power to take actions to execute statutory law in 
the face of congressional silence regarding such implementation). 
 39.  Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–41 (1985) (holding that state 
discretion to create a property interest does not allow the state to restrict procedures to which a 
property owner is entitled by the due process clause of the Constitution). 
 40.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 41.  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001) (explaining why 
courts defer to legislative judgments about how much policy making can be left as part of the 
execution of a statute). See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002) (describing various justifications for the 
nondelegation doctrine but concluding that the doctrine cannot be supported). 
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the executive branch is to implement and enforce law, those statutory 
instructions could reach the point of being sufficiently “executive” to 
constitute interference with the execution of the law; this question is 
the inverse of that posed by the nondelegation doctrine. And the line 
between legislation and execution of law is no easier to draw in this 
context. This is especially so given that the Constitution explicitly 
grants Congress the power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing [legislative] 
Powers . . . .”42 Thus, courts have routinely held that statutes can 
constrain prosecutorial discretion by specifying priorities in 
prosecuting various types of statutory violations. 
A staunch formalist might contend, nonetheless, that specifying 
procedures and providing for judicial review of presidential 
administration of statutes interferes with value judgments regarding 
execution of statutes that are appropriately left to the popularly 
accountable president. Value judgments are clearly relevant to such 
decisions as how to balance the benefits and costs of procedures, and 
how intensely to prosecute various types of statutory violations. The 
Necessary and Proper Clause, however, suggests that Congress, whose 
members are also elected by the people, has authority to interfere with 
executive value judgments in order to effectuate the execution of the 
laws it creates.43 This justifies my belief that Congress can impose 
process-based constraints on presidential exit. And if Congress agrees 
with me that process is important to ensure that the president makes 
exit decisions carefully and accountably, it would do well to specify 
procedures and judicial review when authorizing the president to 
implement a statute directly. 
CONCLUSION 
Ruhl and Salzman’s insight that the regulatory state should pay 
more attention to the substantive criteria for exit from relationships 
between regulators and regulated entities is pathbreaking. Yet the 
uncertainties surrounding regulation—whether due to unknown future 
developments or simply the complexity of regulation at work—makes 
specification of substantive exit criteria difficult. This Essay points out 
that the administrative state has reacted to this difficulty by creating 
 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 43.  Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 2085, 2088 (2002) (arguing that Congress does not encroach on judicial power by specifying 
the means by which courts are to interpret statutes).  
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process-based “backups” for determining exit criteria, such as 
procedures and judicial review. Unfortunately, it has not done so for 
direct regulatory action by the president. When the president 
predicates such action on direct constitutional authority, the 
Constitution provides no peg on which courts can “hang” process-
based constraints. However, when the president acts pursuant to 
statutory delegation of regulatory authority, this Essay suggests that 
Congress can and should provide process constraints such as 
procedures for and judicial review of such actions. 
